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a b s t r a c t
Previous research suggests distinct modes of self-focus, each with distinct functional properties:
Analytical self-focus appears maladaptive, with experiential self-focus having more adaptive effects on
indices of cognitive-affective functioning (e.g., Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2008). The authors applied
this framework to eating disorder (ED) psychopathology and manipulated the mode of self-focus prior to
exposure to a stressor (imagining eating a large meal; Shafran, Teachman, Kerry, & Rachman, 1999). Study
1 showed that students high in ED psychopathology reported lower post-stressor feelings of weight or
shape change and less subsequent attempts to neutralise (e.g., imagining exercising) after experiential
relative to analytical self-focus. Study 2 found that partially weight restored patients with anorexia
nervosa had lower post-stressor estimates of their ownweight and reported lower urge to cancel stressor
effects following experiential compared to analytical self-focus. Experiential self-focus was also followed
by less neutralisation than analytical self-focus. Results suggest that the mode of self-focus affects
cognitive reactivity following a stressor in individuals with ED psychopathology. Examining the mode
within which individuals with ED psychopathology focus on self and body may raise important impli-
cation s for und erstandi ng of ps ychopa thology and open new possibilities for augmenting current
treatments.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd.
Introduction
Much of mental experience is concerned with focussing on
physical and psychological aspects of self. As the literature on
cognitive biases in psychological disorders exempliﬁes (e.g.,
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005), there are differences between indi-
viduals in the subject of this mental activity. An emerging body of
research has also highlighted differences in the way self-focus is
engaged in, besides differences in its content. This research has
raised the critical idea that it is not sufﬁcient to consider self-focus
as a single, monolithic state but that it may be necessary to
discriminate between different types of self-focus. In particular,
investigation of ways one can direct attention to subjective expe-
rience has suggested a distinction between two modes of self-
focus: analytical/ruminative vs. experiential (Teasdale, 1999;
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004).
Analytical self-focus (sometimes also referred to as conceptual-
evaluative or abstract self-focus) is characterised by ‘thinking
about’ the self, one’s emotions and body. In this mode of processing
a focus on discrepancies between current and desired states, and
their evaluation, is a prominent feature. Attention is often directed
to the self in relation to the past or future. In contrast, experiential
self-focus (also referred to as concrete self-focus) is characterised by
direct, non-evaluative attention to present-moment subjective
states (thoughts, feelings, sensations). These are experienced in
their “raw” state as they occur and are not elaborated upon.
Whereas the former corresponds to a narrative-based, conceptual
mode of processing self-material (e.g., “Why do I feel this way” or
“What does this mean?”), the latter corresponds to a sensory-
based, mindful mode of processing characterised by focus on
mental or bodily experience itself in its entirety (e.g., “How does
this feel, right now?”).
Analytical and experiential self-focus can be seen as different
ways of processing self-referent information. It has been suggested
that under conditions of negative and relatively undifferentiated
self-representations, and where there is a discrepancy between
current and desired mental or physical states, self-focus can
become maladaptive (Barnard, 2004; Carver, Lawrence, & Scheier,
1999; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1986;
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stimulate sustained ruminative/analytical processing activity on
negative cognitive-affective content, reinforcing their elaboration,
which in turn is thought to contribute to the establishment of self-
perpetuating processing cycles (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). This
suggests that the particular quality of self-focused attention may be
central to emotional processing, particularly at times of distress
(Teasdale, 1999).
Emotional processing is described as a process whereby
emotional disturbances are absorbed and decline to the extent that
other experiences and behaviour can proceed without disruption
(Rachman, 1980). It has been suggested that analytical and expe-
riential self-focus are mutually exclusive ‘modes of mind’ that
inﬂuence the level of emotional processing that takes place
(Teasdale 1999; Williams, 2008). In the analytical mode, the
continued conceptual-evaluative processing of emotional material
is likely tomaintain emotional disturbances. On the other hand, the
experiential mode disengages individuals from such patterns of
thinking that fuel dysfunctional self-evaluation. At the same time,
in the absence of conceptual-evaluative processing, sustained
experiential processing of emotional material enables emotional
and behavioural change by fostering non-reactive engagement,
exploration and awareness. Thus, whereas the analytical mode is
expected to impede effective emotional processing, the experien-
tial mode is expected to facilitate such processing (Teasdale, 1999).
These theoretical ideas have received increasing support from
studies that manipulate the mode of processing experimentally. An
analytical mode of self-focus has been induced by instructing
participants to “think about the causes, meanings, and consequences
of their thoughts and feelings”. An experiential mode of self-focus
can be induced by instructing participants to “focus attention on
the experience of their thoughts and feelings” thus encouraging
direct moment-to-moment focus (e.g., Watkins & Teasdale, 2004).
Several experimental studies, primarily with depressed samples,
support the hypothesis that the particular mode of processing
adopted during self-focus differentially affects its cognitive and
emotional consequences. For example, manipulating the mode of
self-focus inﬂuences autobiographical memory speciﬁcity,
problem-solving ability, and emotional recovery from a laboratory-
induced negative event, where relative to analytical self-focus,
experiential self-focus has more adaptive effects (Sanders & Lam,
2010; Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins &
Teasdale, 2004).
Park and Barnard (2006), Park, Dunn, and Barnard (in press)
have recently applied these ideas to Eating Disorder (ED). Park
et al.’s account focuses on the mental processing activity under-
lying cognitive-affective content and thus emphasises not only the
thoughts, feelings and bodily experiences that occur in eating
psychopathology, but also how people relate to these experiences. A
key feature of this framework is the suggestion that analytical
thinking is characteristic of ED, in particular Anorexia Nervosa (AN),
and contributes to the maintenance of core ED psychopathology.
For example, analytical processing in the form of persistent self-
evaluation in terms of eating, weight or shape reinforces the
centrality of self-control. A relative absence of bodily and emotional
experience is a consequence of analytical processing, as conceptual
representations of the body are at the forefront (that is, thoughts
about rather than experiences of the body). This effect may be
particularly potent given the ego-syntonic nature of EDs, whereby
individuals are motivated to control emotions and body weight.
This account predicts that shifting individuals away from an
analytical into an experiential mode of processing will interrupt
ruminative thinking and provide an opportunity for the direct
processing and integration of bodily and emotional cues that were
previously avoided. In this way, the experiential mode may fosteremotional change and modiﬁcations in self-representations such
that they are less likely to perpetuate negative processing cycles. In
sum, Park et al.’s (in press) account predicts that an analytical mode
of processing contributes to the maintenance of maladaptive
cognitions, feelings and behaviours in EDs, whereas encouraging an
experiential mode may allow for attenuation of such concerns by
facilitating more effective emotional processing.
There are several reasons to suggest that it may be useful to
think about EDs from a mode of processing perspective. It is known
that core ED psychopathology involves preoccupation with self,
particularly with eating, weight and shape concerns and their
control (Fairburn, Cooper, & Shafran, 2003; Fairburn, Shafran, &
Cooper, 1998). Moreover, ED-related concepts are of central
importance to these individuals’ sense of self (Cooper & Hunt,1998;
Cooper & Turner, 2000; Rawal, Park, & Williams, 2010). Self- and
body-dissatisfaction are common in EDs (e.g., Shafran, Cooper, &
Fairburn, 2002) and indicate the presence of self-ideal discrep-
ancies. Maladaptive self-representations in EDs may thus set the
stage for sustained analytical processing activity.
There is evidence to suggest that analytical self-focus is common
in EDs. Analytical processing involves conceptual/evaluative
thinking, which necessarily removes the person from sustained
direct experience. Rumination e an abstract style of repetitive
thinking about generic aspects of self-experience e and avoidance/
suppression of direct experiential states are seen as key markers of
an analytical mode of processing (Teasdale, 1999; Williams, 2008).
Studies have shown that individuals with ED-concerns score higher
on both measures of rumination (particularly brooding which is
often associated with maladaptive cognitive-affective conse-
quences) and experiential avoidance compared to healthy controls
even after controlling for depression and anxiety levels (Rawal
et al., 2010; see also Wildes, Ringham, & Marcus, 2010). Clinical
interviews reveal that patients with EDs ruminate about life events
and attempt to control internal experiences (Serpell, Treasure,
Teasdale, & Sullivan, 1999; Troop, Holbrey, & Treasure, 1998). This
is line with research that shows reduced awareness of emotional
and bodily states in EDs (Gilboa-Schechtman, Avnon, Zubery, &
Jeczmien, 2006; Kucharska-Pietura, Nikolaou, Masiak, & Treasure,
2004; Wagner, Ruf, Braus, & Schmidt, 2003). Avoidance shows
some overlap with thought suppression, and associations between
rumination, suppression and ED psychopathology have been
reported (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010). Moreover, results from
Rawal et al. (2010) also indicate that ED psychopathology is asso-
ciated with positive beliefs about rumination. Such beliefs are
positively correlated with vulnerability, frequency and intensity of
rumination (Moulds, Yap, Kerr, Williams, & Kandris, 2010;
Papageorgiou & Wells, 2009).
Both rumination and avoidance have been associated with
increased cognitive and emotional dysfunction (Hayes, Wilson,
Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow,
1993; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001) and such tendencies are also
correlated with the onset and maintenance of abnormal eating
behaviours (Lyubomirski, Casper, & Sousa, 2001; Nolen-Hoeksema,
Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 2007). Finally, teaching self-awareness based
on principles of experiential processing is associated with
improvements in self- and body-acceptance in patients with EDs
(Rawal, Enayati, Williams, & Park, 2009).
The aim of the current investigationwas to test the prediction of
Park et al. (in press) that analytical as compared to experiential
processing plays a role in maintenance of symptoms in individuals
with ED psychopathology. Speciﬁcally, we sought to test whether
prior manipulation of the mode of processing differentially affected
cognitive reactivity to an ED-speciﬁc stressor (imagining eating
a large, fatteningmeal) independent of differential effects onmood.
Reactivity to speciﬁc vulnerability-provoking situations is strongly
Table 1
Sample characteristics Study 1.
Low ED (N¼ 9) High ED (N¼ 9)
Variable M SD M SD
Age 20.78 2.28 19.89 1.96
EDE-Q Globala .44 .24 3.73 .61
BMI 20.06 1.38 20.97 1.73
BDIa 4.78 3.67 15.11 6.17
BAIa 3.22 2.64 11.56 8.40
Note: EDE-Q¼ Eating Disorder Examination-Questionnaire; BMI¼ Body Mass
Index; BDI¼ Beck Depression Inventory; BAI¼ Beck Anxiety Inventory.
a Group difference is signiﬁcant.
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extent of emotional processing (Rachman, 1980; Segal et al., 2006;
Teasdale, 1999). Previous research in non-clinical samples has
shown that analytical and experiential self-focus are associated
with the level of stress-related reactivity following exposure to
a failure experience (Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2008). We pre-
dicted that in individuals vulnerable to ED, analytical processing
would be associated with increased stress-induced cognitive
reactivity compared to experiential processing.
Our stressor involved a slightly modiﬁed version of a procedure
developed by Shafran, Teachman, Kerry, and Rachman (1999)
where participants were asked to imagine eating a large,
fattening meal (see Method for further details). Shafran et al.
showed that this procedure produced cognitive and emotional
reactions associated with EDs (e.g., feelings of weight gain, fatness,
anxiety and guilt) and elicited an urge to engage in a corrective
response (e.g., checking or neutralisation). Reactivity was not
mediated by depression or obsessionality, suggesting that this
distortion may be speciﬁc to eating pathology.
Neutralisation refers to an attempt to reduce, remove or
compensate for the discomforting effect of an intrusive thought,
image or impulse (Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, Trant, & Teachman,
1996). Neutralisation is important because it implies a potent effect
of thoughts and it may consolidate the belief that compensatory
thoughts or acts are necessary to deal with emotional distress. We
focused on cognitive forms of neutralisation as opposed to other
forms of corrective action (e.g., weight or shape checking), as
previous research indicates that neutralisation occurs more
frequently and is considered as more effective than checking
(Shafran et al., 1999), and thus may be of clinical signiﬁcance. We
suggest that neutralisation is likely to be exacerbated when pro-
cessing material in a conceptual-evaluative way (i.e., during
analytical self-focus) relative to an experiential mode.
We report two studies. The ﬁrst is an analogue study, comparing
experimental mode manipulations in a student population with
different levels of weight and shape concerns (chosen as a ﬁrst step
because such participants are less likely to suffer from complicating
and co-morbid factors; Holderness, Brooks-Gunn, & Warren, 1994).
The ﬁndings from this study prompted a second study of a small
number of inpatients with EDs, repeating the mode manipulation.
Study 1
Hypothesis
In individuals with a high level of ED psychopathology, an
ED-speciﬁc stressor will elicit less dysfunctional reactions (ED-re-
lated thoughts and neutralisation) after experiential compared to
analytical self-focus.
Method
Design
The designwas a 2 (group: high vs. lowED psychopathology) 2
(condition: analytical vs. experiential) mixed factorial design.
Participants completed both analytical and experiential self-focus
manipulations, each on separate occasions.
Participants
Forty female student volunteers from the University of Oxford
were recruited for this study. The Mini International Neuropsy-
chiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al., 1998) for DSM-IV was used
to determine that participants were free of either current or past
axis-I-disorder including ED. It was administered by onemember of
the research team with training in conducting clinical interviews.Four participants had to be excluded on this basis as the interviews
indicated history of disorder (2 cases of anxiety disorder, 1 case of
major depression, 1 case of ED). Of the remaining 36 participants
who completed the study, those individuals falling into the bottom
and top quartile on the Eating Disorder Examination-Questionnaire
(EDE-Q: Fairburn & Beglin, 1994) were included in the analysis
(9 participants in each group). Participants were 18e26 years of age
(M¼ 20.33, SD¼ 2.11); see Table 1 for characteristics. Participants
had no neurological or current physical illnesses and were un-
medicated at the time of testing. Participants received book
vouchers for participation.
Materials
Questionnaires. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and the Beck
Anxiety Inventory (BAI) were used to assess levels of depressive
and anxiety symptoms, respectively (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer,
1988; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). These
21-item self-report scales measure the presence and severity of
depression and anxiety symptoms over the previous week. Their
validity and reliability have beenwell established (Beck et al., 1988).
Cronbach’s alpha coefﬁcients were .84 and .88, respectively.
The EDE-Q was used as a self-report measure of ED psychopa-
thology. It assesses behavioural and attitudinal features of EDs over
the preceding 4 weeks and comprises a global index of ED
psychopathology and four subscales: restraint, eating concerns,
weight concerns and shape concerns. The questionnaire has good
reliability and validity (Luce & Crowther, 1999; Mond, Hay, Rodgers,
Owen, & Beumont, 2004). Cronbach’s alpha for the subscales
ranged from .76 to .92 in the current study.
Self-focus manipulations. The analytical and experiential self-focus
manipulation tasks (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004) have been designed
to inﬂuence the quality of participants’ thinking. Each manipulation
consists of a list of 28 items or ideas (e.g., “the physical sensations in
your body”, “the way you feel inside”, “the amount of certainty you
feel”, “how sad or happy you are feeling”, “how weak or strong your
body feels right now”) that participants are instructed to concentrate
upon. Participants work through the items sequentially and at their
own pace. Participants were asked to spendmore time on items that
made more sense/were more meaningful to them. Both tasks use
exactly the same items (in the same order) focussing on self, body
state, or emotions. The only difference between the self-focus tasks
lies in how to focus attention on these items, either encouraging an
analytical (“think about the causes, meanings and consequences”) or
an experiential (“focus your attention on your experience of”) mode
of processing. The task is timed for 8 min andparticipantswere asked
to return to the beginning of the list (once again focussing on more
meaningful items) if they hadﬁnishedworking through the entire list
before the time was up.
Self-focus manipulation check. To examine whether the self-focus
manipulations inﬂuenced the way and extent participants were
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(VAS) from 0 to 100 were obtained after each of the manipulations
(analytical check: proportion of thoughts concerned with trying to
understand, explain, or make sense of things; experiential check:
degree of focus on sensory experience; self-focus check: proportion
of time spent focussing on self).
Mood. Participants rated current mood on 2 VAS from 0 to 100
before and after the self-focus manipulations on following
dimensions: happiness and despondency.
Body mass index (BMI). BMI [weight (kg)/height2 (m2)] was calcu-
lated based on participants’ reports of their height and weight.
Stress test. A slightly modiﬁed version of Shafran et al.’s (1999)
imaginary meal task was used as a stressor. Participants were
asked to think of a food they considered extremely fattening and to
complete the sentence “I am eating..” once they had done this.
The purpose of this was to help participants conjure up a vivid
image of eating the “forbidden” food. Participants were instructed
to imagine eating the food as vividly as possible. The length was
standardised to 2 min and operationalised as a guided imagery
task. Participants were given prompts at regular intervals once they
had signalled to have a vivid picture of the food in mind (e.g.,
“Imagine what the food looks like in front you”, “Imagine what it
smells like when you hold it to your nose”, “Imagine placing the
food into your mouth”, “Imagine the ﬂavours and texture in your
mouth”, “Imagine how eating this food makes you feel”). Subse-
quently, we obtained ratings of following ED-related variables:
- Weight estimate: “How much do you think you weigh right
now?”
- Likelihood of weight gain/shape change: “How likely do you
feel it is (0e100%) that you gained weight/changed shape
solely from thinking about eating the forbidden food and
writing the sentence?”
- Urge to reduce/cancel effects: “How strong is your urge
(0e100%) to reduce or cancel the effects of thinking about the
food and writing the sentence?”
Answers to the ﬁrst question were used to calculate a weight
difference score (i.e., the difference between pre-stressor self-
reported weight and post-stressor weight estimate; both
measurements were obtained in kg). We considered these outcome
variables to be clinically important, as it is known that EDs are
associated with distorted self-cognitions and irrational beliefs
about the importance of thoughts about eating, weight and shape
(Fairburn et al., 2003). Moreover, these are often triggered by eating
experiences. On this basis, it seemed reasonable to assume that an
imaginary meal may elicit distorted self-cognitions such as
discrepant perception of body weight and the feeling that one has
gained weight or changed shape. Such responses may play a role in
the maintenance ED psychopathology.
Neutralisation. Self-reported neutralisation was assessed post-
stressor. For this, participants were asked whether they had
engaged in a cognitive form of neutralisation, which was explained
to participants as an attempt to reduce or remove negative feelings
triggered by the stress test (e.g., through a thought or image). We
assessed neutralisation that occurred spontaneously and without
prior suggestion. Based on this neutralisation was coded as present
(¼1) or absent (¼0) for analysis (see Procedure for more details).
Imagery task checks. To assess whether the imagery task was
experienced differently across conditions, ratings on three VASfrom 0 to 100 for focus on food as an image (picture in mind),
vividness/intensity of image, and extent of focus on the image for
the duration of the imagery task were obtained.
Procedure
All participants were tested individually and took part in both
conditions on two separate occasions. Informed consent was
obtained prior to the ﬁrst visit. The sessions took place aweek apart
from each other and the order of completion of conditions was
counterbalanced (half of participants analytical ﬁrst, half experi-
ential ﬁrst). The questionnaire measures and the MINI were spread
over the two sessions and administered before the self-focus
manipulations. Weight and height assessments were obtained
during the MINI and completion of the EDE-Q. The MINI and EDE-Q
were administered on separate occasions due to two reasons: a) in
order to provide a measurement of self-reported current weight on
each day of testing, which was used as the pre-stressor weight
score, and b) in an attempt to avoid that potential changes in mood
due to ED psychopathology assessment were systematically
stronger on a particular day of testing.
After administration of questionnaires, the remaining tasks and
assessments were completed in the following order: time 1 mood
ratings, self-focus manipulation (analytical or experiential), time 2
mood ratings, self-focus manipulation checks, stress test (imaginary
meal e administered during both days of testing), imagery task
checks, and assessment of post-stressor reactions and neutralisation.
To assess neutralisation, participants were left on their own,
unprompted, for 1 min following the completion of the ED-
speciﬁc variables (weight estimate etc.). Upon return, the
researcher asked participants whether they had engaged in neu-
tralisation during this time (neutralisation was explained as
described above). If this was the case, participants were asked if
the neutralisation was related to the imaginary meal task and was
designed to make them feel better (and did not occur due to other
reasons, e.g., boredom). Exact verbatim details were as follows:
During the time that you were alone, were you thinking of or
imagining something in order to help you reduce, remove or cancel
out any negative feelings or distress from the imaginary meal task? If
so, was this speciﬁcally to make you feel better? If you had a thought
or image because of other reasons (e.g., because you were bored) this
does not count. Subsequently, participants were debriefed and
thanked for participation.
Data analysis
Data were analysed by a series of t-tests and analyses of co-
variance (ANCOVA). An alpha level of .05 was used for all statis-
tical tests.
Results
Comparison of participants in high and low ED groups
The groups were comparable in terms of age and BMI (ts< 1.24,
ps> .23). As necessitated by the split of the sample, the high and low
ED pathology groups differed signiﬁcantly in terms of EDE-Q global
and subscale scores (ts> 6.17, ps< .01, ds> 2.91; see Table 1;
subscale scores are not reported in Table 1 but are available on
request). The groups also differed in BDI and BAI levels (ts> 2.83,
ps< .02, ds> 1.33). These were controlled for in following analyses.
Manipulation checks
Self-focus manipulation checks. As expected, signiﬁcantly greater
analytical thinking was reported after analytical than experiential
self-focus, F(1,14)¼ 13.02, p< .01, hp2¼ .48 (M¼ 72.67, SD¼ 11.88 vs.
M¼ 58.06, SD¼ 23.08). Similarly, there was signiﬁcantly greater
focus on momentary sensory experience after experiential than
Table 2
Means and standard deviations for self-focus manipulation checks, mood, imagery
checks, and post-stressor ED-speciﬁc reactions separated by group and condition.
Low ED group (N¼ 9) High ED group (N¼ 9)
Analytical Experiential Analytical Experiential
Measure M SD M SD M SD M SD
Manipulation check
Analytical thinkinga 68.89 10.38 50.00 21.79 76.44 12.64 66.11 22.61
Sensory focusa 45.56 24.04 73.33 12.99 43.33 18.03 69.44 14.02
Self-focus 85.11 9.81 85.00 14.36 85.44 10.16 86.11 12.69
Mood
Happiness, Time 1 68.56 12.07 66.22 12.47 52.11 27.84 60.00 11.97
Happiness, Time 2 58.11 20.71 64.00 11.59 48.67 28.23 56.22 13.66
Despondency Time 1 13.22 19.81 16.67 17.82 39.00 25.62 37.89 23.42
Despondency Time 2 11.89 18.94 17.67 16.51 35.56 21.85 39.11 18.21
Imagery check
Image focus 75.89 10.61 75.56 14.93 71.56 10.65 71.22 7.31
Vividness 72.44 13.69 76.11 13.93 72.22 7.31 73.22 1.14
Duration 73.11 20.44 74.78 19.25 69.33 9.19 70.78 12.18
Stressor reaction
Weight difference
scorea
.02 .07 .00 1.00 .53 1.00 .22 1.09
Likelihood
weight gainc
8.89 15.37 11.11 20.88 28.33 15.21 17.22 18.56
Urge reduce/cancelb 11.19 16.16 10.00 18.03 42.22 31.93 38.56 21.71
N % N % N % N %
Neutralisationd
Yes 2 77.8 0 0 8 88.9 1 11.1
No 7 22.2 9 100 1 11.1 8 88.9
Note: Time 1¼ pre-self-focus manipulation; Time 2¼ post-self-focus manipulation;
Weight difference score¼ post-weight estimate in kg minus self-reported pre-
weight in kg.
a Condition main effect.
b Group main effect.
c Effect of condition in high ED group (group condition interaction).
d Association between frequency of neutralisation and condition in high ED
group.
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SD¼ 13.26 vs. M¼ 44.44, SD¼ 20.64). As predicted, there was no
difference between the conditions in the degree of self-focus
(F< 1). None of the group or condition group effects were
signiﬁcant (Fs< 1). In sum, although the experimental manipula-
tions had equivalent effects on the amount of self-focus in general,
they led to a differential increase in analytical vs. experiential self-
focus ratings, as predicted.
Mood. There was a main effect of group on ratings of despondency,
F(1,14)¼ 12.37, p> .01, hp2¼ .44, which indicated greater levels of
despondency in the high compared to the low ED concern group
(M¼ 37.89, SE¼ 4.63 vs. M¼ 14.86, SE¼ 4.63). No other main
effects or interactions were signiﬁcant (Fs< 2.58, ps> .13), sug-
gesting no self-focus related effect on mood.
Imagery task checks. None of the effects for any of the variables
were signiﬁcant (Fs< 2.41, ps> .13) showing that there were no
systematic differences in the experience of the imagery task
between groups or conditions.
Post-stressor ED-speciﬁc reactions
Self-report. Reactions to the stressor were analysed by separate 2
(group: high vs. low) (condition: analytical vs. experiential)
repeated measures ANCOVAs. Weight difference scores, ratings of
likelihood of weight gain/shape change, and urge to reduce/cancel
effects served as the dependent measures.
The analysis revealed a main effect of condition on weight
difference scores (calculated by subtracting pre-stressor weight in
kg from post-stressor weight estimate in kg; F(1,14)¼ 4.87, p¼ .05,
hp
2¼ .26). Participants gave a reduced estimate of weight after
experiential compared to analytical self-focus (M¼.11, SD¼ 1.02
vs.M¼ .28, SD¼ .74; see Table 2). The main effect for group and the
group condition interaction were not signiﬁcant, Fs< .72,
ps> .40.1
We did not ﬁnd group or condition main effects for ratings of
likelihood of weight gain/shape change, Fs< 3.22, ps> .09.
However, there was a signiﬁcant group x condition, F(1,14)¼ 7.72,
p¼ .02, hp2¼ .37. Paired comparisons showed that this was due to
a greater likelihood of weight gain/shape change after analytical vs.
experiential self-focus in the high, t(8)¼ 2.33, p¼ .05, d¼ .70
(M¼ 28.33, SD¼ 15.21 vs. M¼ 17.22, SD¼ 18.56; see Table 2) but
not low ED group (t(8)¼ 1.00, p¼ .35).
The analysis also revealed a groupmain effect for urge to reduce/
cancel effects of the imagery task, F(1,14)¼ 7.23, p¼ .02, hp2¼ .34,
with greater scores in the high ED compared to the low ED concern
group (M¼ 40.39, SE¼ 5.61 vs. M¼ 10.56, SE¼ 5.61). However,
neither the condition main effect nor the group condition were
signiﬁcant, Fs< .65, ps> .42.
Neutralisation. All instances of neutralisation were related to the
stress test and were aimed at improving mood state. Reported
neutralisation included thoughts such as eating lettuce or imag-
ining exercising. The analysis showed an association between
condition and the frequency of neutralisation (p< .01, Fisher’s Exact
Test). Analysing the sample separated by group showed no associ-
ation between the variables in the low ED group (2 out of 91 Single sample t-tests showed that the differences within conditions were not
signiﬁcantly different from zero (ps> .15). Moreover, correlations between pre-
stressor weight and weight difference scores in each self-focus condition showed
that weight change was not systematically related to participants’ actual weight
(rs<.27, ps> .29). Finally, the pattern of results was identical when analysing
percentage change in estimate of body weight as the outcome.neutralisers after analytical self-focus vs. 0 out of 9 after experi-
ential self-focus; p¼ .47, Fisher’s Exact Test). However, the variables
were signiﬁcantly associated in the high ED group (p< .01, Fisher’s
Exact Test), indicating neutralisation was less likely to follow
experiential than analytical self-focus (1 out of 9 neutralisers in the
experiential vs. 8 out of 9 neutralisers in the analytical condition;
see Table 2).
All analyses were repeated with the order of condition
(analytical ﬁrst vs. experiential ﬁrst) as an additional variable. There
were no main effects for order or interactions with experimental
condition (ps> .17).Discussion Study 1
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the effects of
analytical and experiential self-focus on stress-induced cognitive
reactivity in groups of high and low ED psychopathology. The ED
groups did not differ in age or BMI levels. As predicted, there were
no differences between the self-focus conditions in terms of their
effect on mood, the amount of self-focus, or in the overall quality of
the imaginary meal tasks.
Results showed that analytic self-focus was followed by higher
weight estimates compared to experiential self-focus in both
groups. Experiential self-focus was also associated with lower
likelihood of weight gain/shape change and less reported neutral-
isation than analytical self-focus in the high ED group only.
However, no self-focus effects on the urge to reduce or cancel
effects of the stressor were found.
While the ﬁndings from this study are not entirely conclusive,
they are largely consistent with our hypothesis that analytical and
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cognitive reactivity in individuals with ED concerns, with analyt-
ical self-focus exacerbating ED symptoms.2
Study 2
The second experiment aimed to provide some further evidence
from a clinical sample. We recruited a small series of partially
weight restored inpatients with AN for a within-subject design that
was a procedural replication of Study 1.
Hypothesis
We predicted less stress-induced reactivity (ED-related
thoughts and neutralisation) after experiential compared to
analytical self-focus in the ED group.
Method
Participants
ED patients were recruited from the ED service for Oxfordshire
& Buckinghamshire. This is a tertiary service for patients with
severe EDs. Letters of invitation and information sheets were
distributed to patients who were asked to return a reply slip to
hospital staff if they were interested in taking part in the study.
Twenty-one patients participated, although six patients did not
complete both visits. A further two patients had to be excluded
because their EDE-Q scores were outliers and skewed the distri-
bution (deﬁned as at least two standard deviations below the
mean). Thirteen ED patients completed both visits (analytical,
experiential).
All patients had a clinical diagnosis of AN at time of in-patient
admission, as veriﬁed by independent clinical examination,
although some had gained weight since then.3 Co-morbidity was
frequent: Eight patients had a diagnosis of major depression, three
of obsessive-compulsive disorder, three of generalised anxiety
disorder, ﬁve of social phobia, and three of post-traumatic stress
disorder. One patient also had a past diagnosis of bulimia nervosa.
The MINI and Eating Disorder Examination (EDE; Fairburn &
Cooper, 1993) were carried out to conﬁrm diagnoses. Thirteen
student volunteers from the University of Oxford were recruited as
controls. The MINI was carried out to exclude current or history of
psychiatric disorder. Control participants had no current physical
illnesses and were un-medicated at the time of testing. Other
exclusion criteria for this study were: active psychosis, any medical2 Given the small sample size, we repeated the analysis using a median split on
the EDE-Q to group participants into high and low ED psychopathology groups (18
participants in each group). While the ﬁndings were not as robust, the pattern of
results was largely similar to the quartile split analysis: 1) There was still a main
effect of condition for weight estimate difference scores (F¼ 4.08, p¼ .05, hp¼ .11),
2) there was a trend-level group condition interaction for likelihood of weight
gain/shape (F¼ 3.75, p¼ .06, hp¼ .10), 3) the effect on neutralisation was replicated,
showing an association between condition and the frequency of neutralisation in
the high ED pathology group only (p< .01), where 12 out of 18 participants showed
neutralisation after the stressor in the analytic condition compared to 1 out of 18 in
the experiential condition. These effects occurred in the absence of group differ-
ences in depression, anxiety, or BMI.
3 At time of testing, 5 patients’ BMI was above the formal cut-off for AN of 17.5
because they were on an intensive weight restoration programme. These were not
excluded from the sample, as psychopathology was as severe as those of other
patients who fulﬁlled all diagnostic criteria. However, technically speaking 5 out of
the 13 patients had sub-threshold AN at time of testing. We therefore describe our
clinical sample as patients with EDs or partially weight restored AN. One partici-
pant in the control group had a BMI of 17.5. This participant was not excluded as
there was no other evidence of an ED on any psychopathology measure e interview
or questionnaire. See Results for BMI range for both groups.condition that signiﬁcantly affected concentration, history of head
injury or stroke, or any physical disability that impacted on body
image. Overall, the sample consisted of 26 participants (13 ED
patients, 13 healthy controls) matched for age, sex (all participants
were female) and verbal-IQ (see Table 3). Age in the current sample
ranged from 18 to 37 (M¼ 25.11, SD¼ 4.74). Participants received
book vouchers for participation.
Materials
Clinical interview. The EDE (Fairburn & Cooper, 1993) is a semi-
structured interview, which is considered the ‘gold standard’
interviewer-based measure of ED psychopathology. It was used to
verify diagnosis of EDs in the patient group. The time frame of the
EDE is the past 28 days, but diagnostic items encompass the
previous threemonths. It has good internal consistency, convergent
and divergent validity, test re-test and inter-rater reliability (e.g.,
Fairburn & Cooper, 1993; Rizvi, Peterson, Crow, & Agras, 2000).
Intelligence. The National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982)
was used to assess participants’ verbal-IQ. The NART correlates
signiﬁcantly with scores of full scale, verbal and performance
intelligence tests (Nelson & O’Connell, 1978), and was used to
match the groups in terms of intellectual ability.
In addition to the above instruments, the following materials
were used as in Study 1: the EDE-Q, BAI, BDI, MINI, VAS mood
scales, self-focus manipulations and checks, as well as the same
stress test and imagery checks. One modiﬁcation to the stress test
procedure was made. In Study 1, weight difference following the
stressor was calculated by subtracting current weight from esti-
mated post-stressor weight. It is possible that differences arose
becauseweight estimations were not obtained pre-stressor (weight
estimations are open to subjective inﬂuences and may differ from
actual weight). Therefore, participants were asked to estimate
current weight twice (pre- and post-stressor) and weight change
was deﬁned as the difference between these two measurements.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to the procedure for Study 1 with
the following exceptions: The NART and EDE were included and
administered before experimental manipulations. The EDE was
administered by a member of the research team who had received
training in its use. In all cases diagnosis was consistent with that
established by hospital clinical staff. Participants participated in
two sessions (analytical, experiential) on two separate occasions
(which took place a week apart from each other). The order of
conditions was counterbalanced.
Data analysis
Data were analysed by a series of t-tests and ANCOVAs. An alpha
level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.Table 3
Sample characteristics Study 2.
ED Patients (N¼ 13) Controls (N¼ 13)
Variable M SD M SD
Age 24.46 4.74 25.77 4.85
EDE-Q Globala 4.44 1.19 .53 .47
BMIa 17.16 1.61 21.06 2.87
BDIa 29.38 13.05 3.92 1.85
BAIa 21.15 13.99 7.00 8.29
Verbal-IQ (NART) 119.77 3.39 121.00 3.70
Note: EDE-Q¼ Eating Disorder Examination-Questionnaire; BMI¼ Body Mass
Index; BDI¼ Beck Depression Inventory; BAI¼ Beck Anxiety Inventory;
NART¼National Adult Reading Test.
a Group difference is signiﬁcant.
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Comparison of ED patients and controls
The groups were comparable in terms of age and verbal-IQ
(ts< .89, ps> .38; see Table 3). As expected, the ED patient group
showed higher levels of ED psychopathology than controls in terms
of the EDE-Q global and all subscale scores, all ts(1,24)> 7.81,
ps< .01, ds> 3.18 (subscale means are not reported in Table 3 but
are available on request). The ED group had a signiﬁcantly lower
BMI level than the control group, t(1,24)¼ 4.27, p< .01, d¼ 1.74,
which showed that patients were underweight on average (patient
range¼ 14.17e19.23; control range¼ 17.50e26.50).4 The patient
group also displayed greater levels of depression, t(1,24)¼ 6.96,
p< .01, d¼ 2.84, and anxiety, t(1,24)¼ 3.14, p< .01, d¼ 1.28, and
thus both were entered as covariates in subsequent analyses.
Manipulation checks
Self-focus manipulation checks. Therewas a main effect of condition
on ratings of analytical thinking, F(1,22)¼ 6.67, p¼ .02; hp2¼ .23,
which suggested signiﬁcantly greater analytical thinking after
analytical compared to experiential self-focus (M¼ 64.04,
SD¼ 25.38 vs. M¼ 50.77, SD¼ 21.34).
Similarly, there was a main effect of condition on ratings of
sensory focus, F(1,22)¼ 9.78, p¼ .01, hp2¼ .31, which indicated
greater focus on sensory experience after experiential self-focus
compared analytical self-focus (M¼ 60.77, SD¼ 23.65 vs.
M¼ 50.00, SD¼ 25.77). The analysis also showed a main effect for
group, F(1,22)¼ 7.72, p¼ .02, hp2¼ .26, which was attributable to
higher levels of sensory focus in the control compared to the
patient group (M¼ 73.11, SE¼ 7.31 vs. M¼ 37.66, SE¼ 7.31).
There was no difference in the degree of self-focus between the
analytical and experiential conditions (F< .57). No further group
effects or interactions were signiﬁcant (all Fs< 2.87, ps> .10). In
sum, the analytical and experiential manipulations led to a differ-
ential increase in analytical thinking vs. sensory focus whilst having
equivalent effects on the level of self-focus.
Mood. There was a main effect of group for happiness, F(1,22)¼
4.50, p¼ .05, hp2¼ .17, indicating higher levels of happiness
(M¼ 5.00, SE¼ .45 vs. M¼ 3.33, SE¼ .54) in the control compared
to the ED group. There were no other effects (Fs< 2.54, ps> .12)
suggesting no impact of self-focus manipulations on mood.
Imagery task checks. There was a main effect of group for vividness,
F(1,22)¼ 5.32, p¼ .03, hp2¼ .20, which indicated greater vividness in
the control compared to the ED group (M¼ 8.35, SE¼ .56 vs.
M¼ 6.08, SE¼ .56). No other main effects or interactions were
evident (Fs< 1.87, ps> .18), suggesting no differences in the expe-
rience of the imagery task across conditions.
ED-speciﬁc reactions to stress test
Self-report. Reactions to the stressor were analysed by separate 2
(group: ED patients vs. controls) 2 (condition: analytical vs.
experiential) repeated measures ANCOVAs. The same dependent
measures as in Study 1 were used. Outcome measures were sub-
jected to square-root transformation (no negative values were
present) to normalise distribution.4 We did not covary BMI because this can be seen as (partly) an intrinsic feature
of the difference between ED patients and controls. Both patterns of thought and
behaviour are argued to be related to weight status (e.g., Fairburn et al., 1998; Park
et al., in press). Thus, lowered weight may inﬂuence pathology and the effect of
cognitive processing in EDs, suggesting that BMI contributes variance to the effects
of self-focus on psychopathology.There was no main effect for group on weight estimate differ-
ence scores (F¼ 1.73, p¼ .20). We found a trend for a main effect of
condition (F¼ 3.72, p¼ .07), which was qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant
group condition interaction, F(1,22)¼ 4.14, p¼ .05, hp2¼ .16.
Follow-up analysis showed that this was due to a signiﬁcant
difference in weight estimates (pre-weight estimate in kg sub-
tracted from post-weight estimate in kg thus signalling increase in
weight estimate following stressor) after analytical vs. experiential
self-focus in the ED group, t(12)¼ 2.73, p¼ .02, d¼ .92 (M¼ 1.14,
SD¼ 1.10 vs. M¼ .31, SD¼ .75), whereas there was no difference in
the control group (t(12)¼ 1.59, p¼ .14,M¼ .37, SD¼ .60 vs.M¼ .15,
SD¼ .38; see Fig. 1).
Analysis within conditions showed that ED patients’ weight
estimate change in the analytical condition was also signiﬁcantly
different from zero (t(12)¼ 3.72, p< .01, d¼ .53), suggesting that
patients were signiﬁcantly overestimating their post-stressor
weight. Equivalent comparison in the experiential condition was
not signiﬁcant (t¼ 1.48, p¼ .17). We also examined correlations
betweenweight change scores and participants’ actual weight. This
analysis showed a negative correlation betweenweight and weight
estimate change scores in the analytic condition for ED patients
(r¼.58, p¼ .04), suggesting that lower weight was associated
with greater weight estimate changes. The correlation in the
experiential condition was not signiﬁcant (r¼.38, p¼ .20) and no
associations were found in the control group (rs< .10, ps> .77). The
pattern of results for the weight estimate variable was unaltered
when using percentage change in estimated body weight as the
outcome.
No main effects for group or condition on urge to reduce/cancel
effects following the imaginary meal were found (Fs< 1.05,
ps> .31). However, the analysis revealed a signiﬁcant group -
 condition interaction, F(1,22)¼ 5.31, p¼ .03, hp2¼ .19. Follow-up
analysis showed lower urge to reduce/cancel effects of the
stressor after experiential self-focus compared analytical self-focus
in the ED group, t(12)¼ 2.58, p¼ .02, d¼ .50 (M¼ 4.39, SD¼ 3.64
vs. M¼ 5.89, SD¼ 2.56). There was no difference between the
conditions in the control group (t(12)¼ 1.59, p¼ .14; see Table 4).
Correlations between participant weight and urge to reduce/cancel
effect were not signiﬁcant (rs<.30, ps> .14).
There were no main effects or interactions for likelihood of
weight gain/shape change, Fs< 1.57, ps> .22. However, we did ﬁnd
a trend for a negative correlation between participant weight and0
2.0
ControlEating Disorder
Fig. 1. Change in weight estimate (in kg) following imaginary meal task separated by
group and condition. *¼Difference between analytical and experiential condition is
signiﬁcant (scores were subject to square-root transformation).
Table 4
Means and standard deviations for post-stressor ED-speciﬁc reactions separated by
group and condition.
ED patient group (N¼ 13) Control group (N¼ 13)
Analytical Experiential Analytical Experiential
Measure M SD M SD M SD M SD
Stressor reaction
Likelihood weight
gain
4.75 2.98 2.68 2.83 .24 .88 1.18 1.98
Urge reduce/cancela 5.89 2.56 4.39 3.64 .73 1.89 1.95 3.04
N % N % N % N %
Neutralisationb
Yes 5 38.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
No 8 61.5 13 100 13 100 13 100
Note: Stressor reactions (self-report) on Visual Analogue Scales from 0 to 100.
Stressor reaction ratings were subject to square-root transformation.
a Effect of condition in ED group (group condition interaction).
b Association between frequency of neutralisation and condition in ED group.
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both groups (r¼.37, p¼ .08), suggesting that lower weight was
associated with higher scores on likelihood of weight gain/shape
change.
Neutralisation. All instances of self-reported neutralisation were
related to the stress test and were aimed at improving mood state.
Data showed a signiﬁcant association between condition and
frequency of neutralisation (p¼ .05, Fisher’s Exact Test). Analysing
the groups separately revealed a signiﬁcant association between
neutralisation and condition in the ED patient group (p¼ .04,
Fisher’s Exact Test), but none in the control group (where no neu-
tralisation occurred at all). In the ED group, neutralisation occurred
less frequently following experiential self-focus compared to
analytical self-focus (0 out of 13 neutralised after experiential self-
focus, 5 out of 13 neutralised after analytical self-focus; see Table 4).
All analyses were repeated with order of condition as an addi-
tional variable. There were no main effects or interactions with
experimental condition (ps> .18).
Discussion Study 2
The aim of this experiment was to explore the hypothesis that
analytical self-focus in patients with EDs would have more detri-
mental effects on emotional processing than an experiential mode
of self-focus. Consistent with this hypothesis, results showed that
ED patients had higher post-stressor estimates of their ownweight
following analytical self-focus and lower urges to cancel effects of
the stressor following experiential self-focus. Moreover, reported
neutralising cognitions were less frequent following experiential
compared to analytical self-focus. However, no effects on likelihood
of weight gain/shape change were found.
These ﬁndings await extension to larger samples. It should also
be noted that EDE-Q levels in the control group were lower than
existing norms for non-clinical groups (e.g., Mond et al., 2004) and
comparisons to this group may have inﬂuenced results. Despite
these limitations, results suggested that the mode of processing
distinctly inﬂuenced the level of cognitive reactivity following an
imaginary meal task in a sample of ED patients, consistent with
predictions. Effects occurred in the absence of any impact of the
self-focus manipulation on mood (replicating previous ﬁndings in
depression; e.g., Watkins & Teasdale, 2004), or differences between
the conditions in the experience of the imagery task, and when
controlling for depression and anxiety levels. We did not covary
BMI in this study based on the argument that this may contribute
important variance to the effects of cognitive processing in EDpatients (see 4). Correlations showed that weight was negatively
associatedwith bothweight estimate change and feelings of weight
gain/shape change post-stressor in the analytic condition only. This
suggests, as predicted by Park et al. (in press), that in individuals
vulnerable to EDs lowered weight may amplify the effect of
analytical processing on stress-induced cognitive reactivity. It
should be noted that the overall pattern of results remained
unchanged (although effect sizes were smaller) when we repeated
analyses covarying for BMI, indicating that while weight status may
exacerbate the effect of analytic processing, self-focus effects are
not inherently attributable to BMI.
General discussion
The aim of our experiments was to examine the effect of
manipulating the mode of self-focus on stress-induced cognitive
reactivity in individuals with ED psychopathology. To date, empir-
ical studies of mode of self-focus have been primarily applied to
depression. The present experiments extend this work to EDs and
are the ﬁrst to suggest that the consequences of self-focused
thinking in EDs are moderated by the mode of processing,
whereby an experiential mode is more adaptive relative to an
analytical mode.
While not all variables were equally affected by the mode
manipulation, the effects that we found were consistent with our
hypothesis. Our outcome measures speciﬁcally tapped into beliefs
associated with EDs (e.g., distorted weight perception, neutralisa-
tion). The ﬁnding that the mode in which information is processed
moderates such outcomes after being exposed to a stressor is of
clinical signiﬁcance. Distorted perception about weight is argued to
be involved in the maintenance of psychopathology (e.g., Vitousek
& Hollon, 1990). Equally, neutralisation is important because it may
represent a dysfunctional way of regulating distress, one that is
likely to reinforce the over-evaluation of eating, weight and shape
that is typically seen in EDs. Analytical processing is likely to
exaggerate the tendency to focus on and evaluate self in the context
of ED-related concepts. Consequently, the stress that eating causes
may be exacerbated in this mode compared to experiential pro-
cessing where it is likely to be less potent and ‘self-deﬁning’. Pro-
cessing emotional material in an experiential mode may thus
weaken the connection between thoughts about eating and weight
gain or neutralisation.
We assessed cognitive reactivity after exposure to an imaginary
meal task, an experience that may resemble real-life eating situa-
tions which can often trigger psychopathology. This is because
stress tests are likely to bring dysfunctional self-representations
“online”, setting the stage for problematic responses. Previous
research has shown that the extent of reactivity in response to
challenges (e.g., induction of sad mood) predicts the persistence of
psychopathology (Segal et al., 2006) and may be taken as index of
the extent of emotional processing (Rachman, 1980; Teasdale,
1999). Our results suggest that the way individuals respond to
such vulnerability-provoking situations may depend on the way
self-material is processed, where analytical self-focus increases
dysfunctional cognitive reactivity and impedes effective emotional
processing compared to experiential processing which is likely to
support more effective emotional processing. This effect may be
due to the interruption of maladaptive cognitive-affective pro-
cessing cycles, which serves to ‘inoculate’ vulnerable individuals
from becoming engrossed in ED-related thoughts and feelings, thus
allowing for alternative and less dysfunctional responses.
From a theoretical perspective, these results are consistent with
Park et al.’s (in press) prediction of the distinct effects of analytical
and experiential self-focus on ED psychopathology. This account
speciﬁcally suggests that both cognitive content and process
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cognitive theories in EDs would predict that focussing on self and
body would have negative consequences (e.g., Fairburn et al., 2003;
Garner & Bemis,1982). However, these theories cannot explain how
processing the same material in different modes is associated with
distinct outcomes. For example, whereas clinicians and researchers
have identiﬁed over-focus on the body, shape and weight as a core
feature of ED psychopathology, the core issue may be over-focus on
ideas about the body rather than the experience of the body.
It is known that ruminative responses to situations are likely to
maintain negative mood and dysfunctional attitudes (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Spasojevic &
Alloy, 2001). Consequently, it has been suggested that interrupting
ruminative processing cycles through shifting mode of self-focus
may be an important factor for facilitating recovery from affective
disorders and preventing relapse (Broderick, 2005; Crane,
Barnhofer, Visser, Nightingale, & Williams, 2007; Segal, Williams,
& Teasdale, 2002). Given the signiﬁcance of this distinction for
depression, it may turn out to be of importance for EDs as well.
While the mode of self-focus does not explain the development of
disorder-speciﬁc concerns, it maye if further substantiatede be an
important process in the maintenance of dysfunctional thoughts
across a range of psychopathologies, including EDs. Fostering
experiential forms of self-awareness is one component of
mindfulness-based interventions and initial evidence supports its
effectiveness in treating EDs and for improving cognitive and
behavioural ﬂexibility (Merwin et al., 2011; Wanden-Berghe, Sanz-
Valero, & Wanden-Berghe, 2011).
Our studies were the ﬁrst empirical investigation of processing
mode in EDs. As such, a number of issues require further inquiry. For
example, it remains to be seenwhether changes in processingmode
can lead to enduring and clinically meaningful changes. One crucial
prediction of the mode of processing framework is that it is the
interaction of maladaptive cognitive-affective content and process-
ing mode that is critical. While our ﬁndings were largely restricted
to groups with ED pathology, our data do not prove that only those
with ED pathology would show this effect. Demonstrating that the
ED-speciﬁc stressor does not differentially affect responses of
another psychiatric control group would be needed to substantiate
this claim. For example, although depressed individuals are highly
ruminative and show negative self-representations, the current
stress task would be expected to show little effect in this group, as
they differ in disorder-speciﬁc content. Moreover, our data do not
show that stressors increase analytical thinking in EDs. Measuring
momentary levels of analytical and experiential self-focus before
and after the stress test would provide answers about the cause and
effect of analytical processing. For example, verifying that stressors
increase analytical self-focus in EDs (un-manipulated) and that this
effect can be modiﬁed by manipulations would further support the
utility of the mode of self-focus framework and for targeting the
processing mode as a potential intervention.
A focus on both content and processing modemay also allow for
a better understanding of potential peculiarities and implications of
analytical processing in disorders such as EDs and depression. As
described earlier, analytical self-focus involves ‘thinking about’
current and desired states of self. Unlike depressionwhere current-
ideal discrepancies and the criteria for closing this ‘gap’ are rather
abstractly deﬁned, the criteria used to make such judgements in
EDs can be very concrete and measurable (e.g., weight change,
waist size, or calorie intake). Therefore, rumination on generic
aspects of self may be more characteristic of depression, whereas in
EDs it may involve processing activity on more concrete features.
Whereas concrete rumination has generally been thought of as
more adaptive than abstract rumination (e.g., Watkins, 2008) as it
aids problem-solving and goal progress, the suggestion here is thatwhat seems to be concrete (e.g., shape or weight) is thought about
rather than experienced. The point here is that anything can be
processed analytically rather than experientially, and it is themode
with which it is processed that is critical, rather than the
concreteness or abstraction of the referent itself.
It would be interesting to delineate the effect of self-focus on
neutralisation further. Neutralisation effects were most consistent
across both studies. As this was assessed following completion of
other outcome measures and a brief ‘pause’ period, it may suggest
that the effects of emotionally evocative events and their moder-
ation unfold over time. As such, it would be interesting to examine
cognitive reactivity over longer time periods. It may also be of value
to assess other forms of neutralisation (e.g., crossing out or re-
phrasing sentences) and to include checking behaviours (weight
or mirror checking) to unpick this effect further. Checking behav-
iours are associated with ED concerns (e.g., Cooper, Deepak,
Grocutt, & Bailey, 2007; Shafran et al., 1999), and acting on the
basis of stress-related reactivity may reinforce a maladaptive
cognition-behaviour link. This would also be useful as EDs are
related to deﬁcits in interoceptive awareness (e.g., Kucharska-
Pietura et al., 2004), implying that self-report assessments may
be problematic. Psychobiological measures may also usefully
extend our studies, as emotional reactivity is expressed in various
output systems which may be differentially affected.
Finally, some speciﬁc limitations of our studies need consider-
ation. First, our sample requires some consideration. Our clinical ED
sample consisted of individuals with partially weight restored AN.
Wewere not able to quantify the degree of weight restoration and it
is not clear what inﬂuence treatment and weight gain have on the
processing of self-material (assessment of BMI levels at entry point
and duration of EDs may prove important). Park et al. (in press)
suggest that ruminative processing and its effects are exacerbated
by low weight in those with EDs, which ﬁts with clinical observa-
tions of worsening pathology with lower weight. Although our
results suggested some inﬂuence of weight status on the effects of
self-focus in this direction, it remains to be systematically examined
whether self-focus effects are related to reductions inweight levels.
Generally, in-patient populations represent a minority of AN
cases, indicating a particularly severe ED, which may impact on
generalisability of our ﬁndings. For example, it is known that EDs
are associated with rigid thinking styles (see Roberts, Tchanturia,
Stahl, Southgate, & Treasure, 2007), which may be further com-
pounded in severe cases. Cognitive inﬂexibility may inﬂuence the
degree to which individuals are able to shift into an experiential
processing mode. Therefore, concurrent training in cognitive ﬂex-
ibility may aid experiential processing manipulations.
Second, the current self-focus manipulations were developed
for dysphoric people with much less psychopathology than
individuals with clinical EDs. Given the tendency towards
avoidance in ED samples, stronger effects may be obtained with
more extensive experiential training procedures, or in those with
less psychopathology.
Third, it is unclear from our data whether the analytic condition
worsened reactivity or the experiential condition improved it. To
clarify this, a neutral ﬁller condition would have to be used.
However, because each participant was their own control, we can
say that the manipulation made a difference to reactivity to the
stressor, and that this reaction did not seem to be mediated by
difference in imageability of the food, or differences in mood. At
this early stage in studying the impact of mode of processing, these
are encouraging results that merit further investigation. One would
expect potentially beneﬁcial effects of distraction tasks to be short-
lived and that individuals would revert to habitual, maladaptive
processing styles, whereas an experiential mode may provide
a beneﬁcial form of self-focus.
A. Rawal et al. / Behaviour Research and Therapy 49 (2011) 635e645644Finally, we used a within-subjects design and it is possible that
participants were aware of the crucial difference between the
manipulations. While no participant correctly guessed the
hypothesis, it is still possible that demands effects affected the
response pattern.
In sum, while much work remains outstanding, our ﬁndings
suggest distinct inﬂuences of the mode of processing on cognitive
reactivity induced by an imagined eating stressor. These ﬁndings
have clinical relevance for ED. The mode of processing analysis
might augment understanding of psychological treatment and
theory of EDs, ﬁrstly, by enhancing understanding of how effective
treatments work, and secondly by providing a rationale for focus-
sing on the processes e as well as content e underlying mainte-
nance of psychopathology. In particular, the results add weight to
the suggestion that interventions targeting analytical, ruminative
processing in EDmay augment existing interventions (Park et al., in
press). Cognitive treatment for EDs has shown beneﬁt to a wide
range of patients with EDs but has limitations, particularly in the
treatment of severe AN (Berkman, Lohr, & Bulik, 2007; Wilson,
Grilo, & Vitousek, 2007). Notably, content-focused treatment
approaches alonemay not be effective in some individuals with EDs
(Vanderlinden, 2008). Positive beliefs about EDs and its symptoms
are common (Serpell et al., 1999) and many afﬂicted individuals
seem resistant to changing thought content directly, or ﬁnd this
extremely difﬁcult. Specifying aspects of process more explicitly
may allow key phenomenology to be modelled more fully in order
to develop more effective adjunctive strategies for treating ED
psychopathology.Acknowledgement
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